This paper describes the design and the semantics of MetaKlaim, an higher order distributed process calculus equipped with staging mechanisms. MetaKlaim integrates MetaML (an extension of SML for multi-stage programming) and Klaim (a Kernel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility), to permit interleaving of meta-programming activities (like assembly and linking of code fragments), dynamic checking of security policies at administrative boundaries and "traditional" computational activities on a wide area network (like remote communication and code mobility). MetaKlaim exploits a powerful type system (including polymorphic typesá la system F) to deal with highly parameterized mobile components and to dynamically enforce security policies: types are metadata which are extracted from code at run-time and are used to express trustiness guarantees.
Introduction
The distributed software architecture (model) which underpins most of the wide area network (WAN) applications typically consists of a large number of heterogeneous computational entities (sometimes referred to as nodes or sites of the network) where components of applications are executed. Differently from traditional middle-wares for distributed programming, the structure of the underlying network is made manifest to programmers of WAN applications. In general, the various nodes are handled by different authorities having different administrative policies and security requirements. Components of WAN applications are characterized by an highly dynamic behavior and have to deal with the unpredictable changes over time of the network environment (changes due to the unavailability of network connectivity, lack of services, node failures, network reconfiguration, and so on). Moreover, nomadic or mobile components must be designed to support heterogeneity and interoperability because they may detach from a node and re-attach later on a different node. We refer to [FPV98] and [Car99] for comprehensive analysis of issues related to WAN applications.
The problems associated with the development of WAN applications have prompted the study of the foundations of programming languages with advanced features including mechanisms for code and agent mobility, for managing security, and for coordinating and monitoring the use of resources. Several foundational calculi have been proposed to tackle most of the phenomena related to WAN programming. We mention the Distributed Join-calculus [FGL + 96], Klaim [DFP98] , the Distributed π-calculus [HR01] , the Ambient calculus [CG00a] , the Seal calculus [VC99] , and Nomadic Pict [SW00] . All these foundational models encompass a notion of location to reflect the idea of administrative domains: computations at a certain location are under the control of a specific authority. In other words, they focus on the spatial dimension (which is often referred to as network awareness) of WAN programming.
In a WAN setting no central authority can define and enforce policies which regulate accesses to network resources. Moreover, components of applications should be designed to be executed and interoperate with potentially malicious components. The advent of safe programming languages such as Java and C has led to the definition of strong type systems which can be effectively exploited to rule out a variety of security bugs. Notice that the use of a typed intermediate code has come into prominence in the last few years (e.g. the Java Bytecode or the Microsoft Intermediate Language). However, static type checking cannot detect all potential security holes. Current run-time environments exploit some mechanisms (e.g. see [SMH00, Sch00, FBF99] ), like reference monitors and certifying compilers, to dynamically check security properties which cannot be enforced either statically or at linking time. Dynamic enforcing of security checks increases the security level of WAN applications, because it permits to identify those portions of applications code that are potentially untrusted, and can support the revocation of previously granted permissions to partially trusted code. Moreover, components of WAN applications are often developed and maintained by different providers/principals and may be downloaded and linked together "on demand". Hence, the run-time system may interleave computational activities with meta-programming activities, such as dynamic linking, assembling and customization of components, that permit to reconfigure the application without having to restart it. In fact, the interest towards formally understanding dynamic linking (and separate compilation) is witnessed by several papers that have recently tackled the problem [Car97a, MG99, HWC00, Dro00, HW00, Sew01]. To sum up, dynamic enforcement of security properties together with dynamic assembling and customization of components make the temporal dimension of WAN programming.
The spatial and the temporal dimensions of WAN programming have been studied at considerable depth but in isolation, and their interplay has not been properly formalized and understood, yet. This paper proposes a foundational model which integrates the spatial and temporal aspects of WAN programming. We have abstracted the basic features of the problem in a calculus having primitives for programming processes which may migrate among nodes, and primitives which support fine-grain control on dynamic linking of components and dynamic checking of security policies. Our calculus, called MetaKlaim, builds on Klaim [DFP98, KHP98, DFPV00] and MetaML [TS97, She99, TS00, MHP00]. Klaim (Kernel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility) is an experimental language, inspired by the Linda coordination model [Gel85, CG89] , specifically designed to model and to program WAN applications by exploiting distribution and mobility. MetaML supports staging constructs for meta-programming and most features of SML. It is ideal for describing customization and combination of software components, since the staging constructs have the same status of the other programming constructs.
MetaKlaim takes the form of an higher-order distributed process calculus where staging handles naturally typed code. The calculus is designed around the following ingredients:
• Localities and code mobility to deal with the spatial dimension of WAN programming;
• Polymorphic typesá la system F to deal with highly parameterized mobile components;
• Types, namely metadata extracted at run-time from potential untrusted code, to dynamically enforce security policies;
• Staging and meta-programming constructs (á la MetaML) to link, specialize, adapt, run and reconfigure mobile components by taking advantage of run-time type information.
In this paper we introduce the operational semantics of MetaKlaim. To our knowledge, this is the first semantics for a general-purpose higher order distributed process calculus with staging constructs. The operational semantics performs dynamic type checking of untrusted code, thus the trustness guarantees of wide are network applications are maintained, even when they interoperate with potentially untrusted components. Moreover, the type system of MetaKlaim and the dynamic type checking can ensure local Type Safety, i.e. type safety of just that part of the net we want to control.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives further motivations for our work; Section 3 presents the syntax of MetaKlaim and discusses the main linguistic design choices; Section 4 and 5 introduce a type system and define the operational semantics for MetaKlaim; Section 6 states and demonstrates the type safety result; Section 7 gives a few examples of distributed and mobile code applications; Section 8 presents some comparisons with related work; finally, Section 9 draws some conclusions and discusses directions for further work.
Further Motivations
Current software technologies emphasize the notion of components as the key idiom to control the design and the development of applications. Ideally, programmers should design and build applications by combining and integrating together (pre-existing) components. To support this simple idea, programming languages should provide mechanisms to link and specialize components. In other words, components are assumed to be generic and pluggable to other components to achieve the required functionalities. Modern operating systems and programming languages (such as Java) include dynamic linking mechanisms as a fundamental part of their run time environment. COM [Cor01] and Java Beans [Mic02] support component updating: run-time type checking is used to determine what versions of components are available.
Components often embody facilities to specialize their structure and generate efficient code once the parameters of the components have been provided. These components are called generative [EC00] . An illustrative example is given by C++ template mechanisms and template metaprogramming [MS96] . Multi-stage programming languages have been proposed for writing generative components. For instance, [KCC00] presents several examples of components, described as higher-order macros in a functional meta-language similar to MetaML.
The execution cycle of component-based programming (that is characterized by the ability of integrating components into applications) consists of 1. Finding the required components; 2. Linking and specializing components; 3. Running the application assembled from components.
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The advent of network technologies introduces new phenomena: components are available on the net and are managed (and provided) by different authorities. The use of components in a WAN environment raises a number of interesting issues. First, given the heterogeneity of the environment net components should be highly portable: components could be used anywhere but require some services to behave properly (i.e. services are used to adapt components to a variety of infrastructures). Functional abstraction is not enough for expressing the desirable forms of parametrization. Also a limited form of polymorphism, like that supported by SML, appears inadequate. Second, security should be ensured: components downloaded from different authorities have different security requirements, and they should be executed within different run-time environments. Third, dynamic adaptability should be ensured: WAN applications are highly dynamic and can reconfigure their structure and their components at run-time to respond to dynamic changes of the network environment.
Thus, in the case of WAN programming, the execution cycle of components includes additional steps and becomes:
1. Downloading generic components; 2. Adapting components to the local infrastructure and the local execution environment; 3. Fixing the loading and specialization policies according to local requirements; 4. Monitoring the execution of the assembled application; 5. Reconfiguring the application and its policies whenever the network environment changes.
The refined execution cycle (we will call it the network cycle), also applies to nomadic (mobile) applications: it suffices to substitute the Download step with a MoveTo step. This is important because it has been widely acknowledged that mobility [FPV98, RPM00] provides a suitable abstraction to design and implement WAN applications. In particular, the usefulness of mobility emerges when developing both applications for devices with intermittent access to the network, and network services having different access policies.
Current technologies provide solutions only to some of the issues discussed above. For instance, in the Java programming language heterogeneity is handled through bytecode interpretation. Permissions, grants and stack inspection handles dynamic check of possibly untrusted code. C generics account for highly parameterized generic components [KS01] . The .NET architecture supplies a programming technology embodying general facilities for handling heterogeneity and orchestration of WEB services. • m, n range over the set N of natural numbers. Furthermore, m ∈ N is identified with the set {i ∈ N|i < m} of its predecessors.
• Syntactic equivalence, written ≡, is α-conversion. FV(e) is the set of free variables in e.
If E is a set of syntactic entities, then E 0 indicates the set of entities in E without free variables.
• e ranges over finite sequences of e. |e| is the number of elements in the sequence e. e 1 , e 2 denotes the concatenation of the sequences e 1 and e 2 (and similarly for sequences Γ 1 and Γ 2 of declarations). e: t is a shorthand for e i : t for each e i in the sequence e.
• ρ ranges over substitutions, i.e. functions (with finite domain) mapping variables to terms (or types). ∅ is the empty substitution, x: = e is the substitution mapping x to e, and ρ 1 , ρ 2 denotes the union of two substitutions (with disjoint domains). e[ρ] is the result (modulo α-conversion) of applying the substitution ρ to e.
• µ(A) is the set of multisets with elements in A, and is multiset union.
• Given a BNF e: = P 1 | . . . | P m , we write e+ = P m+1 | . . . | P m+n as a shorthand for the extended BNF e: = P 1 | . . . | P m+n .
From Klaim [DFP98, KHP98, DFPV00] we borrow the computational paradigm, which identifies processes as the basic units of computation, and nets, i.e. collections of nodes, as the coordinators of process activities. Each node has an address, called locality, and consists of a process component and a tuple space (TS), i.e. a multi-set of tuples. Processes communicate asynchronously via TSs. The types of MetaKlaim include the types L and (t i |i ∈ m) of localities and tuples, but not a type of processes, because process actions can be performed by terms of any type. In MetaKlaim the primitives of Klaim take the following form:
• spawn(e) activates a process (obtained from e) in a parallel thread.
• new(e) creates a new locality l, activates a process (obtained from e) at l, and returns l.
• output(l, e) adds the value of e to the TS at l (output is non-blocking).
• input(l, (p i ⇒e i |i ∈ m)) accesses the TS located at l for gathering data. The input operation checks each pattern p i and looks in the TS at l for a matching value v. If such a v exists, it is removed from the TS, and the variables x!t declared in the matching pattern p j are replaced within e j by the corresponding values in v. If no matching tuple is found, the operation is suspended until one becomes available (thus input is a blocking operation). Notice that input exploits dynamic type-checking (namely a matching v must be consistent with the types attached to variables declared in a pattern).
Remark 3.2 In Klaim there is a primitive eval(l, e) for activating a process at a remote locality l. This primitive is used for asynchronous process mobility, but it has not been included in MetaKlaim for the following reasons:
• eval relies on dynamic scoping (a potentially dangerous mechanism), which is not available in MetaKlaim, since in a functional setting one can use (the safer mechanism of) parameterization.
• with eval a node may activate a process on another node, but the target node has no control over the incoming process. This can be a source of security problems. In particular, Local Type Safety (see Theorem 6.2) fails, if eval would be added.
In MetaKlaim process mobility occurs only by "mutual agreement", i.e. a (sending) node can output a process abstraction in any TS, but the abstraction becomes an active process only if (a process at) another (receiving) node input it. Higher-order remote communication between nodes, like that provided by Klaim, is essential to implement this form of mobility.
From MetaML [TS97, She99, TS00, MHP00] we borrow the types t for code with potentially unresolved links (represented by dynamic variables), the stratification into levels of declarations (level n > 0 for dynamic variables) and evaluation (level n > 0 for symbolic evaluation), and the following staging annotations:
• Brackets e constructs code representing the program fragment obtained by the symbolic evaluation of e, e.g. 2 + x is a value of type nat representing the fragment 2 + x, where x is a dynamic variable.
• Escape˜e returns the program fragment represented by code e. During symbolic evaluation Escape is used for splicing program fragments into bigger programs, e.g. λx.1 +˜ 2 + x evaluates to λx.1 + 2 + x .
• Cross-stage persistence %e permits to use the value of e at a higher level, e.g. %(1+1)+x evaluates to %2 + x . Notice that %(1 + 1) and˜ 1 + 1 have the same type, but their symbolic evaluation is different: the first evaluates to %2, while the second evaluates to 1 + 1.
• run(e) executes the program represented by code e, e.g. run 1 + 1 evaluates to 2. • execution of code with unresolved links, e.g. the evaluation of λx.˜(run x ; . . .) will attempt to evaluate run x , before the dynamic variable x gets bound to a value.
• extrusion of a value with free dynamic variables from the scope of the binding lambda, e.g. the evaluation of λx.˜(output(l, x ); . . .) will output x in the TS located at l, thus loosing the connection with the binding lambda.
In a statically typed language these improper behaviors can be prevented by a more sophisticated type system, e.g. • a numerable set XT of type variables, ranged over by X, . . .;
• a numerable set X of term variables, ranged over by x, . . .;
• a numerable set L of localities, ranged over by l, . . .;
• a finite set Op = {spawn, new, output, input, run} of local operations, ranged over by op.
The syntax of MetaKlaim can be explained in terms of system F , Klaim and MetaML.
• From system F we borrow functional types t 1 → t 2 , abstraction λx: t.e and application e 1 e 2 , and polymorphic types ∀X.t, type abstraction ΛX.e and instantiation e{t}.
• Terms e ∈ E: : = x | l | λx: t.e | e 1 e 2 | fix x: t.e | (e i |i ∈ m) | π j e | op e • From MetaML we borrow code types t , and the staging annotations brackets e , escape˜e, and cross-stage persistence %e; run is among the local operations Op.
• Finally, we have recursive definitions fix x: t.e and projections π j e.
In MetaKlaim, we perform a dynamic type check, when we input an untrusted value from a tuple space, in order to ensure some trustiness guarantees. The type system of MetaKlaim is relatively simple, and the guarantees we can express are limited. For instance, we cannot express constrains on the computational effects of a term, such as the ability to spawn new threads or to perform input/output. We circumvent this limitation of the type system by allowing only the input of global values.
Definition 3.4 A term e ∈ E 0 is global ∆ ⇐⇒ it has no occurrences of local operations op ∈ Op.
Thus the only way we can turn a global value v into a process (interacting with its environment) is by passing some local operations (possibly in customized form), in other words v must be a higher-order abstraction representing processes parameterized w.r.t. customized local operations. Even if we improve the expressiveness of type system by adding effects, there is still a need to consider processes parameterized w.r.t. customized local operations, and this parameterization will require also effect polymorphism (besides type polymorphism).
Remark 3.5 The use of dynamic type dispatching in a distributed polymorphic programming language has been strongly advocated in [Dug99] . For simplicity, we have chosen not to include dynamic type dispatching in MetaKlaim, but it would be a very appropriate extension.
However, one may wonder whether input(x!t⇒e) of MetaKlaim is semantically equivalent to typecase of (x: t)e of [ACPP91, ACPR95] . In fact, they are different! To simplify the comparison we consider a type U of untrusted values, and replace the input primitive with a construct check against (x!t)e.
• The type U of untrusted values has the following introduction and elimination rules
at run-time we have to check that v has type t (in the empty context).
• In [ACPP91, ACPR95] the type D of dynamics has similar introduction and elimination rules (provided we do not consider pattern variables in types)
at run-time we only need to check equality of types.
Therefore, the two mechanisms accomplish different useful tasks. For instance, if we have an untrusted dynamic value u(d(v: t)), we must first check that d(v: t): D (or equivalently that v: t), and only then we can compare t with other types to decide how to use v safely.
Type System
The type system derives judgments of the following forms
• Γ , i.e. Γ is a well-formed context
• Γ n t, i.e. t is a well-formed type at level n ≥ 0
• Γ n e: t, i.e. e is a well-formed term of type t at level n ≥ 0 Levels are typical of multi-level languages (like λ of [Dav96] ). In a dynamically typed multistage language, like MetaKlaim (see also [SSP98] ), type variables get bound at different stages of a computation, and thus well-formedness is level dependent not only for terms, but also for types. The declarations in a context Γ have the following meaning: X n means that the type variable X ranges over types t at level n, while x: t n means that the term variable x ranges over values of type t at level n. Figure 2 gives the typing rules. Most of them are the multi-level extension of standard typing rules. The only typing rules that deserve some comments are:
Γ n e 1 : t 1 → t 2 Γ n e 2 : t 1
Γ n e 1 e 2 : t 2 fix Γ, x: t n n e: t Γ n fix x: t.e: t
Figure 2: Type System
• The rule for type variables supports a form of cross-stage persistence (as in [SSP98] ), namely an X declared at level m can be used at higher levels.
• The typing for run has the additional premise Γ n t, since the other premise implies only that Γ n+1 t.
• Rule (case) uses some auxiliary notation, namely a context Γ n (p) and a sequence e(p) of terms defined by induction on p ∈ P as follows:
Basic Properties of the Type System
Properties like Weakening and Substitution are typical of type systems. Substitution is particularly important, since it clarifies the meaning of different declarations, namely how the type and level assigned to a variable x constrain the terms that may safely replace it. Lemma 4.5 expresses a property of interest for multi-level languages, namely how the validity of a judgment is affected when (some of) the levels are incremented. The situation is more subtle when (some of) the levels are decremented (see Lemma 6.5).
Notation 4.1 [Notation and Convention used in the rest of the paper]
• Γ J ranges over the possible judgments of the type system, thus J matches anything that can be on the right hand side of .
• Γ +1 is the context obtained from Γ by incrementing the level of each declaration by 1,
i.e. X n becomes X n+1 and x: t n becomes x: t n+1 .
Lemma 4.2 (Weakening)
The following rules are admissible
Proof: By induction on the derivation of Γ 1 , Γ 2 J.
Lemma 4.3 (Substitution)
Proof: By induction on the derivation of Γ 1 , X m , Γ 2 J and Γ 1 , x: t m , Γ 2 J respectively.
The following lemma implies that the type of a closed term is necessarily closed. This property is quite subtle, for instance it fails if we extend the language with an exception exn: t, instead of a polymorphic constant raise exn : ∀X.X.
Lemma 4.4 (Strengthening)
Lemma 4.5 (Promotion) The following rules are admissible Remark 4.6 One can easily adapt a type inference algorithm for system F (e.g. see [Car97b] )
to MetaKlaim. Namely, given Γ, e and n the algorithm either returns a t such that Γ n e: t is derivable (t is unique up to α-conversion), or fails when such a t does not exists.
Operational Semantics
Following the Klaim computational paradigm, we define the operational semantics over nets.
) is a multi-set of pairs consisting of a locality l and either a process p(e), or a value u(v) in the tuple space, or exn indicating that a process at l has raised an exception, or err indicating that a process at l has crashed.
The dynamics of a net is given by a relation N ===⇒ N defined in terms of two transition relations e a > e and e > exn | err for terms 1 : err means that a process has crashed, this is different from node failure (that we do not model), and from a deadlocked process (e.g. a process that is waiting to input a tuple that never arrives); exn means that an exception has been raised (for simplicity we do not provide exception handling facilities, although in practice they are important). The transitions relations are defined in terms of evaluation contexts (see [WF94] ) and reductions r 0 a > e (and r 0 > exn | err) for actions and r 1 1 > e | err for symbolic evaluation. 
Reduction and Transition Relation
Even if we are interested in defining > only on closed terms, we must consider open redexes because of evaluation under (dynamic) lambda. Figure 4 defines the reduction > and uses the following auxiliary operations:
• Function match(p, v 0 ) either returns a closed substitution ρ: X f in → V 0 0 or f ail. Its definition is by induction on p ∈ P. The base cases are:
1 We write e > exn | err to denote e > exn or e > err (and similarly for other transition relations).
• • Demotion v n+1 ↓ n ∈ E is defined by induction on v n+1 ∈ V n+1 (and vp n+1 ∈ VP n+1 ):
In all other cases ↓ n commutes with the top level term (and pattern) construct. We comment some of the reduction rules in Figure 4 (the others are standard):
• The rules for spawn, new, output and input come from Klaim, those for run and symbolic evaluation 1 > come from MetaML.
• spawn (and similarly new and output) checks that the process spawned is closed (in order to prevent scope extrusion), and raises an exception otherwise.
• input is non-deterministic and requires pattern matching, which includes dynamic typechecking of global values. Moreover, input may get stuck, e.g. input(l, x!X⇒e) is stuck because there are no closed values of type X.
• run checks that the value that is demoted is closed (in order to prevent unresolved links), and raises an exception otherwise.
• All reductions to err correspond to type-or level-errors. For instance,˜e and %e are not well-typed at level 0, nor is x when all variables are declared at level > 0.
The transition relation > is defined (in terms of > ) by the following standard rules
Net Transition Relation
The relation ===⇒ is defined (in terms of > ) by the following rules
> e 1 N (l: p(e)) ===⇒ N (l: p(e 1 )) (l: p(e 2 )) e l2:e2
L is the set of localities in the net N . The rules have an obvious meaning, we just remark that the side condition in the last rule ensures freshness of l 2 .
Basic Properties of the Operational Semantics
The following properties are straightforward to prove.
Lemma 5.3 (Reduction)
If r a > e or r 1 > e , then FV(e ) ⊆ FV(r).
Lemma 5.4 (Unique Decomposition) Given n ∈ N and e ∈ E, then
• either e ∈ V n
• or exist (unique) i ∈ {0, 1} and E n i ∈ E n i and r i ∈ R i such that e ≡ E n i [r i ]
Proof: By induction on the structure of e ∈ E.
Lemma 5.5 (Transition) If e ∈ E 0 and e a > e , then e ∈ E 0 .
Proof: Immediate from Lemmas 5.4 and 5.3.
Type Safety
In order to express the type safety results we introduce two notions of well-formed net: one is global, the other is relative to a subset L of nodes.
Definition 6.1 (Well-formed Net)
Global: A net N is well-formed ∆ ⇐⇒ (l: err) ∈ N , and for every (l: p(e)) ∈ N exists t s.t.
∅ 0 e: t.
Local: A net N is well-formed w.r.t. L ⊆ L(N )
∆ ⇐⇒ (l: err) ∈ N when l ∈ L, and for every
In the definition of well-formed net nothing is said about values u(v) in the tuple spaces, since they are considered untrusted. In fact, processes can fetch such values only through the input primitive, which performs dynamic type-checking. The type safety theorem then guarantees that a well-formed net will never give rise to typeor level-errors. Together with dynamic type checking performed with input operations, these imply that our type system can be used for protecting hosts from imported code, thus ensuring various kinds of host security properties (as in [YH99b] ).
Remark 6.3 The local type safety property is enforced by two features of MetaKlaim: the dynamic type-checking performed by the input operation (namely match), which prevents ill-typed values in tuple spaces to pollute well-typed processes; the absence of Klaim's eval primitive, which would allow processes external to L to spawn ill-typed processes at a locality in L. For instance, with an eval primitive similar to a 'remote' spawn the following net transition would become possible
where v bad is any closed value (at level 0) such that v bad () > err.
Technical Lemmas for Type Safety
The proof of Type Safety relies on the basic properties of the type system (see Section 4.1), and the following lemmas linking operational semantics and type system.
Notation 6.4 [Auxiliary definitions and notations used in this section]
• a means that action a is well-formed. Action τ , i(v) and o(v) are always well-formed.
Actions s(e) and l: e are well-formed, provided that ∅ 0 e: t for some t.
• Γ n (E n i ) is the typing context for the hole in the evaluation context E n i ∈ EC n i , and is defined by induction on E n i ∈ EC n i (and Ep n i )
In all other cases Γ n ( ) is applied to the immediate sub-context. Γ n (vp n ) is a special case of Γ n (p) defined in Section 4 (indeed, according to the grammars in Figures 1 and 3 , VP n is included in P).
• e > err means that e > err does not hold (and similarly e > err).
Lemma 6.5 (Demotion) The following rules are admissible
Proof: The first two rules are proved by mutual induction on the derivation of Γ +1 and Γ +1 n+1 t. The third rule is by induction on the derivation of Γ +1 n+1 v n+1 : t.
Lemma 6.6 (Structure) If Γ 0 v 0 : t, then one of the following possibilities holds:
• v 0 ≡ λx: t 1 .e and t ≡ t 1 → t 2 with Γ, x: t 0 1 0 e: t 2
• v 0 ≡ v 1 and t ≡ t with Γ 1 v 1 : t
• v 0 ≡ ΛX.e and t ≡ ∀X.t with Γ, X 0 0 e: t Proof: By induction on the structure of p ∈ P.
• Base case x!t. ρ is x: = v 0 and Γ 0 (p) is x: t. The property follows immediately from the definition of match.
• Base case x = e. ρ is x: = v 0 ∈ L and Γ 0 (p) is x: L. The property follows immediately from v 0 ∈ L.
• Inductive step (p i |i ∈ m). Γ 0 (p) ≡ Γ 0 (p 0 ), . . . , Γ 0 (p m−1 ) and v 0 must be of the form
, then ρ(x) = ρ j (x) and the property follows by the induction hypothesis for p j .
Lemma 6.8 (Safety and Subject Reduction for > )
• If Γ +1 0 r 0 : t, then r 0 > err and r 0 a > e implies Γ +1 0 e : t and a.
• If Γ +1 1 r 1 : t, then r 1 > 1 err and r 1 1 > e implies Γ +1 1 e : t.
Proof: By induction on the derivation of Γ +1 i r i : t. The last rule in the derivation uniquely determines (the structure of) r i .
• (var) contradicts that r i is a redex, because all x declared in Γ +1 are at a level > 0 • (fix) implies r 0 ≡ fix x: t.e τ > e[x: = fix x: t.e] and Γ +1 , x: t 0 0 e: t. By Lemma 4.3 (and Γ +1 0 fix x: t.e: t) we get Γ +1 0 e[x: = fix x: t.e]: t.
• (proj) implies r 0 ≡ π j v 0 and Γ +1 0 v 0 : (t i |i ∈ m) with j < m and t ≡ t j . By Lemma 6.6 v 0 must be of the form (v 0 i |i ∈ m) with Γ +1 0 v 0 i : t i for i ∈ m, therefore r 0 τ > v j .
• (spawn) implies r 0 ≡ spawn v 0 , t ≡ (), and
Otherwise exn.
• (new) is similar to (spawn).
• (output) implies r 0 ≡ output v 0 , t ≡ () and Γ +1 0 v 0 : (L, t ). By Lemma 6.6 v 0 must be of the form (l, v 0 0 ) with
• ( • (run) implies r 0 ≡ run v 0 , Γ +1 0 v 0 : t (and Γ +1 0 t). By Lemma 6.6 v 0 must be of the form v 1 with Γ +1 1 v 1 : t. If v 1 ∈ V 1 0 , then r 0 τ > v 1 ↓ 0 and ∅ 1 v 1 : t by Lemma 4.4. Therefore, by Lemma 6.5 we get ∅ 0 v 1 ↓ 0 : t. Otherwise exn.
• (spec) implies r 0 ≡ v 0 {t 1 } and Γ +1 0 v 0 : ∀X.t 2 and Γ +1 0 t 1 with t ≡ t 2 [X: = t 1 ]. By Lemma 6.6 v 0 must be of the form ΛX.e with Γ +1 , X 0 0 e: t 2 . Thus r 0 τ > e[X: = t 1 ], and by Lemma 4.3 we get Γ +1 0 e[X: = t 1 ]: t.
• (esc) implies r 1 ≡˜v 0 and Γ +1 0 v 0 : t . By Lemma 6.6 v 0 must be of the form v 1 with Γ +1 1 v 1 : t, and thus r 0 τ > v 1 .
Lemma 6.9 (Replacement for Evaluation Context) If E n i ∈ EC n i and Γ n E n i [e]: t, then exists t ∈ T such that
Proof: By induction on the structure of E n i ∈ EC n i and the derivation of Γ n E n i [e]: t.
Lemma 6.10 (Safety and Subject Reduction for > ) If ∅ 0 e: t, then e > err and e a > e implies ∅ 0 e : t and a.
Proof: By Lemma 5.4 either e ∈ V 0 (and there is nothing to prove) or e ≡ E 0 i [r i ] for some i. In the latter case, by Lemma 6.9, we have Γ 0 (E 0 i ) i r i : t for some t . Thus we can apply Lemma 6.8, since Γ n (E n i ) is always of the form Γ +1 (see Notation 6.4).
Finally we prove Theorem 6.2.
Proof: We give the details only for the proof of Local Type Safety (the proof of Global Type
Safety is similar). The proof is by case-analysis on the rule used to derive N ===⇒ N . The only interesting cases correspond to net transitions that involve at least one locality in L:
• if e > exn, then the safety property remains trivially true
• if e > err, then l ∈ L because of Lemma 6.10
• if e τ > e and l ∈ L, then e is well-typed at level 0 by Lemma 6.10
• if e i(v 0 )@l 2 > e and l 1 ∈ L, then e is well-typed at level 0 by Lemma 6.10
• if e o(v 0 )@l 2 > e and l 1 ∈ L, then e is well-typed at level 0 by Lemma 6.10, and whether l 2 ∈ L is irrelevant for the safety property
> e 1 and l ∈ L, then e 1 and e 2 are well-typed at level 0 by Lemma 6.10
• e l 2 :e 2 > e 1 and l ∈ L, then e 1 is well-typed at level 0 by Lemma 6.10, also e 2 is well-typed, but it is irrelevant for local safety because l 2 ∈ L.
Examples
In this section, we exemplify the use of MetaKlaim to program WAN applications. Each example is presented in a simplified form, but addresses a significant aspect in WAN programming. The first example, group communication, deals with generation of lightweight efficient components implementing a form of broadcast remote communication. The second example, nomadic data collector, addresses the issue of protecting host machines from mobile code that travels along the net for retrieving information on a piece of data. The third example, dynamic linker and loader, illustrates separation of concerns supported by generative components. In the rest of this section, we will freely use ML-like notations for functions, local declarations, datatypes, lists, conditional and sequential composition. Moreover, for type-setting reasons, we write fn x:t.e instead of λx: t.e and V X.t instead of ∀X.t.
Group Communication
We introduce a function grout that implements a form of group communication: a message (the parameter of the function) is broadcasted to each locality of a given list statically known. Function grout is a simple example of multipoint applications (e.g. audio/video applications) which exploit multicast communications. In fact, function grout can be tought of as a basic building block for constructing more sophisticated applications which permit, e.g., to dynamically change the group of receivers or to hierarchically structure the group (like in distributed mailing lists). We make use of the following types: We first present a version of grout that does not use staging. As it is expected, function grout takes a list of localities l and a message x as arguments and outputs a tuple containing x at each locality in l. Notice that to be well-typed the message has to be a global value. This version of grout does not take advantage of the fact that its parameters are available at different stages of the computation. Indeed, the fact that the list parameter l is statically available (while the message parameter x will be available at run time) offers an opportunity to optimize the code of the function with respect to l. In this way, the overhead of looking up the first element of l, and of recursively calling the function on the tail of l each time a message has to be sent, can be removed. The main advantage of p_o over p is better performance.
Adaptive applications can benefit from code generation, as described in [HS01] . The following application extends p with a new functionality, that permits to change the list of destinations
One can obtain the process ap dest from a general template ap_gen parameterized w.r. More precisely ap dest amounts to ap_gen(upd dest, upd) where upd y x = grout(y,x).
However, we can exploit the code generator grout_cg for defining a different updating function upd y = run(grout_cg y), that returns a better do.
Nomadic Data Collector
We now address the issue of protecting host machines from possibly malicious mobile code. Consider the following scenario. A certain user requires to assemble information on a piece of data (e.g. the price of certain devices). Part of the behavior of the user's application strictly depends on this information. However, there are some activities which are independent of it. The user's application can be structured to exploit the mobility paradigm: a mobile component can dynamically travel among hosts of the net looking for the required information. Here, for simplicity, we assume that each node of the distributed database contain tuples of the form (i,d), where i is the search key and d is the associated data, or of the form (i,l), where l is a locality where more data associated to i can be searched. We make use of the following types: The types of meta operations exploit code types, hence meta operations are able to insert the code fragments of the operations provided locally into larger programs.
The type of code abstractions (e.g. the type of mobile code) is parameterized with respect to the locality (where the code will be executed) and the meta-operations. In other words, the type of code abstractions can be intuitively interpreted as the network environment of the code. This environment must be fed with the information about the current location and its local operations. We want to emphasize the fact that the meta-operations for communication require an authorization key as parameter. In such a way, depending on the value of the key k (that is checked in the example below by a function safe), the meta-operation in' k could generate an actual input without run-time overhead, or () when the key does not allow to read anything (or customized run-time checks, that we do not detail). Customization of the other local operations can be done similarly. We now discuss the main module of our mobile application: the nomadic data collector. The code abstraction pca(k,i,u) is the mobile code which retrieves the required information on the distributed database. The parameter k is an authorization key, i is a search key, and u is the locality where all data associated to i should be collected. The behavior of the mobile code pca(k,i,u) is rather intuitive. After being activated, pca(k,i,u) spawns a process that perform a local query (here the query removes data which are associated in the local database to the search key i). Then the mobile code forwards the result of the query to the tuple space located at u, and sends copies of itself (i.e. of pca(k,i,u)) to localities that may contain data associated to i. In the definition of pca(k,i,u) cross-stage persistence is used to hard-wire the parameters i and u at the appropriate level. 
The code abstraction pca(k,i,u) is instantiated and activated by process execute. This process fetches code abstractions of type CAK from the local tuple space, instantiates them by providing a customized environment env, and finally activates the resulting code. 
Dynamic Linking and Loading
We now present the MetaKlaim implementation of a basic facility to dynamically load components. We have already pointed out that a key issue of most WAN applications is the ability to control the loading policy of components. One may want either to load components justwhen-needed, or prefer to fetch in advance all components requested by a certain application. The following process execute fetches a parameterized component from the local tuple place, generates code by supplying it a meta-linker, and then spawns a process that executes the generated code. An invocation of the meta-linker will be of the form <...~(mlinker n)...>. The escape operator~e is used to insert delayed computation into larger computation. Using the meta programming facilities, the programmer has a fine grain control on the evaluation order of the program. For instance, the meta-linker can decide whether to invoke the linker at code generation time, i.e. mlinker n = <%(linker n)>, or whether to generate code for invoking the linker at run-time, i.e. mlinker n = <%linker %n>. In the first case, linker n is statically evaluated; if the linker fails to make a connection, the code of the application will not be executed at all.
Notice that the MExecute cannot be transmitted over the net. It is not a mobile component since it will not get through the dynamic checking of the pattern matching. The critical point is that the input operation could have been programmed to download a malicious component from a remote, untrusted, host.
A mobile Meta-Execute can be programmed as follows fun MMExecute (self:L, mlinker:MLinker, in', spawn', run'):() = fix exec:().
in' (self, x!PC=> spawn'(() => run'(x mlinker)) ; exec)
The type of MMExecute is parameterized with respect to the locality (where the code will be executed) and the local operations exploiting the full power of system F.
Related Work
There are several approaches related with some of the issues tackled by MetaKlaim. Some of these approaches have been mentioned in the first two sections of the paper, here we only consider the most strictly related one and draw comparisons with some process languages equipped with process distribution and higher-order remote communication. [YH99b] extends to Dπλ the type system of [YH02] for an higher order variant of the π-calculus. This type system permits controlling the effect of transmitted process abstractions on local resources (i.e. channels). All the remarks about the first type system also apply to this one.
Furthermore, differently from MetaKlaim, processes are assigned fine-grain types that, like interfaces, record the resources to which processes have access together with the corresponding capabilities, and process abstractions are assigned dependent functional types that abstract from channel names and types. Although process abstractions are not polymorphic as in MetaKlaim, channel names may appear and be bound both in terms and in types and thus, in some sense, play the role of MetaKlaim type variables.
Confined-λ [Kir01]
is an higher-order functional language that supports distributed computing by allowing expressions at different localities to communicate via channels. In Confined-λ, authors of code can assign regions (i.e. subsystems) to values in order to limit the part of a system where a value can freely move. Then, a type system is defined that statically guarantees that each value can roam only within the corresponding region. Differently from our approach, communication is channel based, localities cannot be dynamically created, the transmissible process abstractions can be parameterized with respect to channel names, and the type of a transmissible value restricts the subsystem where the value can freely move. The Confined-λ type system is completely static and relies on restrictions laid on values whenever they are used as arguments of output operations, while the MetaKlaim type system relies on dynamic checks whenever input operations are performed. Moreover, differently from MetaKlaim, a Confined-λ program may execute only if all the expressions it contains are well-typed. In conclusion, while the MetaKlaim approach better fit open and untrusted large scale distributed systems, the Confined-λ approach is more suitable for guaranteing secrecy properties, i.e. that a given (secret) information is not leaked outside a fixed subsystem, in small scale distributed systems.
Additional examples of type systems for distributed higher order functional languages can be found in [Kir02] . In addition to the previous considerations, we can also say that they all use static effect systems for approximating dynamic properties, while MetaKlaim uses global values, which is a naive way of saying that processes have no effect annotations in their type.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have described MetaKlaim, a foundational calculus for global computing. Our approach is based on polymorphic typesá la system F, staging constructs (á la MetaML), and dynamic type checking. To the best of our knowledge, MetaKlaim is the first calculus that integrates multi-stage features with primitives for mobile distributed processes. In this paper we have mainly focussed on developing the foundations of its mathematical theory, but we believe that our programming notations can form the core of a real programming language with facilities for code mobility and multi-stage programming. The consistency of operational semantics and type system implies that in our approach hosts are protected from imported code, thus ensuring various kinds of host security. This, together with the possibility of partially checking MetaKlaim nets only relatively to subsets of localities, make MetaKlaim suitable for
programming applications in open and, possibly, untrusted large scale distributed systems.
Process calculi with distribution and mobility other than Klaim could in principle be enriched with staging and meta-programming constructs. However, if some properties must be guaranteed, mobile code should be dynamically checkable and, possibly, customizable. This in practice requires the exploitation of higher-order remote communication (to split code migration into code exchange and code spawning) and code types at the object level, and does not seem to fit well with process calculi with just name passing.
There are several directions one can consider for improving MetaKlaim, for instance
• We could replace Klaim's flat structure of localities with hierarchical (dynamically changing) tree structure typical of Ambients [CG00b] . Each ambient will have a tuple space, a pool of local processes, and a pool of (mobile) sub-ambients.
• We could refine the type system into a type-and-effect system [TJ94] , and extend it with dynamics [ACPR95, Dug99].
• We could introduce guardians for monitoring node activities [FMP02] , in addition to the dynamic checks performed by processes (during an input-action).
As a future work we plan to implement MetaKlaim by possibly exploiting the Klaim prototype implementation as a starting point. The Klaim prototype implementation can be downloaded from the Klaim homepage [KHP98] , while its detailed description, together with some programming examples, can be found in [BDP02] . Moreover, we also plan to develop realistic WAN applications to gather more data for further validating the advantages of the approach and to assess our linguistic choices (for example, different forms of output could be envisaged that differ for the amount of performed checks and, then, for the secrecy properties guaranteed).
